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This paper addresses claims that dreams can be a source of personal insight. Whereas
there has been anecdotal backing for such claims, there is now tangential support from
findings of the facilitative effect of sleep on cognitive insight, and of REM sleep in
particular on emotional memory consolidation. Furthermore, the presence in dreams of
metaphorical representations of waking life indicates the possibility of novel insight as an
emergent feature of such metaphorical mappings. In order to assess whether personal
insight can occur as a result of the consideration of dream content, 11 dream group
discussion sessions were conducted which followed the Ullman Dream Appreciation
technique, one session for each of 11 participants (10 females, 1 male; mean age =
19.2 years). Self-ratings of deepened self-perception and personal gains from participation
in the group sessions showed that the Ullman technique is an effective procedure for
establishing connections between dream content and recent waking life experiences,
although wake life sources were found for only 14% of dream report text. The mean
Exploration-Insight score on the Gains from Dream Interpretation questionnaire was very
high and comparable to outcomes from the well-established Hill (1996) therapist-led
dream interpretation method. This score was associated between-subjects with pre-group
positive Attitude Toward Dreams (ATD). The need to distinguish “aha” experiences as a
result of discovering a waking life source for part of a dream, from “aha” experiences of
personal insight as a result of considering dream content, is discussed. Difficulties are
described in designing a control condition to which the dream report condition can be
compared.
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INTRODUCTION
There have been many claims of dreams enabling individuals
to obtain insight about their emotional and interpersonal life
(e.g.,Freud, 1953/1900; Rycroft, 1979; Blechner, 2001). However,
much of the evidence here is anecdotal, or based on case-
studies, and scientific investigation is difficult. There have also
been claims about scientific discoveries being derived from
dream experiences (Barrett, 1993), for example, that Kekulé’s
dream or vision of “whirling snakes” led him to insight regard-
ing the structure of the Benzene ring, and that a dream of
Mendeleev led him to his structure for the periodic table of
the elements (Barrett, 2001, with critical account by Baylor,
2001). Whilst it is difficult to validate claims that some scien-
tific insights are attributable to dream experiences, numerous
cognitive experiments have been devised to assess the relation-
ship between sleep and insight. Wagner et al. (2004) used a
mathematical task, the number reduction task (NRT), which
can be solved either by a relatively lengthy calculation method,
or by more sudden insight into a hidden rule. In the study
initial training on the NRT was followed by 8 h of either noc-
turnal sleep, or nocturnal wakefulness, or daytime wakefulness.
At subsequent retesting, more than twice as many subjects gained
insight after sleep than after wakefulness. The authors concluded
that sleep, by restructuring new memory representations, facil-
itates extraction of explicit knowledge, and results in insightful
behavior.
Later studies, investigating the cerebral correlates of cognitive
insight using the NRT and fMRI, highlight an involvement of
the prefrontal cortex in the insight process. Rose et al. (2010)
found that insight was associated with fMRI-signal increase in
the ventral striatum and the right ventrolateral prefrontal cor-
tex. Following this, Darsaud et al. (2011) identified the neural
precursors of delayed insight on this task. In their study, nor-
mal volunteers practiced the NRT during two fMRI sessions
(training and retest), taking place 12 h apart across a night of
sleep. After this delay, some subjects gained insight into the hid-
den task structure (termed solvers), whereas the others did not
(termed non-solvers). It was found that, during training, solvers
and non-solvers differed in their cerebral responses associated
with implicit learning. Furthermore, in solvers, but not in non-
solvers, response patterns were also transformed overnight, with
enhanced responses in ventral medial prefrontal cortex, an area
previously implicated in the consolidation of declarative mem-
ory. During retest in solvers, before they gained insight into the
hidden rule, significant responses were also observed in the same
medial prefrontal area.
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As there is experimental support for the hypothesis that sleep
facilitates cognitive insight and creative thinking (Maquet and
Ruby, 2004; Stickgold and Walker, 2004; Wagner et al., 2004;
Darsaud et al., 2011), it is plausible that sleep could allow per-
sonal/affective insight, and that this might be reflected in dream
content, given the interaction between characters, and emotional
content, in most dreams (Nielsen and Lara-Carrasco, 2007).
Interestingly, the ventral medial prefrontal cortex, whose activity
is modified during sleep and is enhanced before cognitive insight
during wakefulness (Darsaud et al., 2011), shows increased activ-
ity in REM sleep compared toNREM sleep (for a review, see Ruby,
2011). As a consequence, one may expect that REM dreams could
be more supportive of insight than NREM dreams. In support of
this hypothesis, Walker et al. (2002) reported that REM awaken-
ings provide a significant advantage in the number of anagrams
solved compared with NREM awakenings, the number solved
being equal to that of wake time trials. The authors concluded that
the neurophysiology of REM sleep represents a brain state more
amenable to flexible cognitive processing than is NREM sleep.
A similar conclusion is drawn by Cai et al. (2009), who found
that, in comparison to quiet rest and NREM sleep, REM sleep
enhances the integration of unassociated information for creative
problem solving. Related to this, Stickgold et al. (1999) found
that subjects awakened from REM sleep show greater priming by
weak primes (e.g., thief-wrong) than by strong primes (e.g., hot-
cold). In contrast, strong priming exceeds weak priming inNREM
sleep, just as in wake. The authors conclude that the shift in weak
priming seen after REM sleep awakenings suggests that cognition
during REM sleep is qualitatively different from that of waking
and NREM sleep and may reflect a shift in associative memory
systems. They hypothesize that this shift underlies the bizarre
and hyper-associative character of REM sleep dreaming, and that
these cognitive and dream content characteristics of REM sleep
are due to the cholinergic and noradrenergic neuromodulation
specific to that sleep stage.
Another neurochemical change, the increase in cortisol in the
second half of sleep, is proposed by Payne (2010) as being one of
the reasons for the increase in bizarreness of dreams across the
night, which she says may be reflective of hyper-associativity, and
of creative thinking and novel combinations of previous infor-
mation, although Blagrove et al. (2012) show that this increase
in cortisol occurs for NREM and REM sleep. It may also be
that the relationship of sleep to insight is a component of the
widely evidenced view that sleep, and in particular REM sleep,
is involved in emotional memory consolidation and emotional
regulation (e.g., Walker and Van der Helm, 2009; Perogamvros
and Schwartz, 2012; Groch et al., 2013). This memory consoli-
dation during sleep is held to go beyond the making permanent
of individual items, to involve also a process of abstraction from
experience, and the integration of new experiences into cur-
rent schemata, so that the gist of experiences is distilled (Lewis
and Durrant, 2011; Stickgold and Walker, 2013). Whereas Lewis
and Durrant (2011) and Diekelmann and Born (2010a,b) con-
clude that current empirical knowledge points more to such
abstraction and schemata production occurring in slow wave
sleep, Stickgold and Walker (2013) state that not enough is
known to exclude REM from these processes, and that evidence
of the neural replay of waking life events during REM sleep
(Louie and Wilson, 2001) supports the inclusion of REM in these
processes.
Such neural processes of insight and memory consolidation
during sleep are proposed by Wagner et al. (2004) and Wamsley
and Stickgold (2011) to be related to the formal characteristics of
dream experiences. As stated by Stickgold et al. (2001), “dreams
would appear to be not only unpredictable and bizarre but highly
emotional as well” and they propose that “these features reflect an
attempt, on the part of the brain, to identify and evaluate novel
cortical associations in the light of emotions mediated by limbic
structures activated during REM.”
An important precursor, however, to the claim that dreams
are related to these neutrally-based insight or schemata chang-
ing processes, or even that dreams themselves, when considered
during wakefulness, can lead to insight, is that dream content
reflects, or is relatable to previous waking life experiences. There is
indeed considerable evidence for this, with dream content being
related to waking life concerns or events in naturalistic studies
(Saredi et al., 1997; Domhoff, 2003; Schredl, 2006; Bulkeley and
Domhoff, 2010; Blagrove et al., 2011a,b; Malinowski and Horton,
2011), to concerns that the dreamer has been instructed to dream
of, in comparison to control concerns (Nikles et al., 1998), and
to thoughts consciously suppressed prior to sleep (Wegner et al.,
2004; Bryant et al., 2011). Furthermore, individuals who have
experienced a trauma can be differentiated from control indi-
viduals on the basis of dream reports (Hartmann et al., 2001a,b;
Kuiken et al., 2008). Although there are caveats here, of dreams
being generic (Hobson and Kahn, 2007), and of studies in which
individuals with prominent waking life characteristics cannot be
distinguished from controls on the basis of dream reports (para-
plegia and deaf-mutes, in Voss et al., 2011; blindness, in Staunton
and O’Rouke, 2012), overall the findings are of dream content
being linked to waking life experience. Whether the manner of
representation of waking life in dreams allows for creative insight
about waking life is then the question to be addressed. The null-
hypothesis is that dreams do not provide novel or insightful
information to the dreamer, and nor does dream content provide
useful information about the dreamer to anyone else; as stated by
the psychiatrist Allan Hobson: “I never learned anything from a
client’s dreams that I did not already know.” (Hobson and Schredl,
2011).
Contrary to this null-hypothesis, there have been many claims
of the clinical use of dreams providing personal insight. According
to Pesant and Zadra (2004), in therapy “three types of gains are
generally described as a result of dream interpretation: (1) client
insights, (2) increased involvement of the client in the therapeu-
tic process, and (3) a better understanding of clients’ dynamics
and clinical progress.” To evidence point (1), they cite researchers
and clinicians’ reports that the clinical use of dreams enhances
clients’ insight, with better self-knowledge, self-understanding, or
self-awareness. In order to define and characterize insight they
refer to Elliott’s et al. (1994) conceptualization of it “as containing
four elements: (1) metaphorical vision—to see oneself in a new
light; (2) connection—to uncover some patterns in one’s exis-
tence or some links between different aspects of one’s experience;
(3) suddenness—an affective reaction of surprise, as if things fell
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down into place in one’s mind; and (4) newness—the sense of
having discovered something that was not previously known.”
The first of these four elements is explored by Lakoff
(1993), who proposes that waking life concerns are represented
metaphorically in dreams (the view also of Domhoff, 2003), and
that the production of dreams, and the interpretation of dreams,
draw upon our waking life system of conceptual metaphors.
Hartmann (1998) similarly proposes that dreams portray waking
life emotional concerns as picture metaphors, so as to inter-
connect old and new memories. For Hartmann, this has the
function of ameliorating recent distressing emotions, a function
that would hold for dreams that are recalled on waking as well
as for ones that are not recalled. He thus proposes that dream-
ing, even where dreams are not recalled, acts as psychotherapy
(see also Hartmann, 1995). Such proposals of metaphor produc-
tion in dreaming can be seen as a special case of the general
issue of metaphors in therapy, as described by Evans (1988). For
Evans (1988), metaphors can originate from the client or the
therapist, and he gives examples where the interpretation or dis-
cussion of a metaphor, which can lead to progress and insight,
is aided by the “emotional distance” from threatening mate-
rial that the metaphor allows. Pesant and Zadra (2004) make
a similar observation that clients may be less reluctant to dis-
cuss disturbing issues when these are approached through dream
exploration, because of the safer distance between the client and
the material evoked by a dream. Similarly, Rennie (1994) suggests
that narratives allow patients in psychotherapy to talk around
their problems, but that gradually sources of personal concern
are brought to light, and in this way narratives help create the
possibility of insight.
In a metaphor, the tenor, or topic, is expressed in terms of
the vehicle, which can be more familiar or more concrete. Evans
(1988) holds that using metaphor to describe one’s experience
catalyses change and growth, and advocates a conscious use of
metaphors for this, because “the language of inner experience and
self-discovery is largely metaphorical.” He states that, for tenor
and vehicle, “this interaction between the two systems of associ-
ations extends the meaning of both terms, which contributes to
the epistemic creativity of metaphor.” Similarly, Tourangeau and
Sternberg (1982) propose that this interaction enables new things
to be discovered, and not just for the two concepts being asso-
ciated but for the whole of their domains as well. Furthermore,
Tourangeau and Rips (1991) describe metaphor interpretation
as being more reliant on the perception of emergent, rather
than well-established, similarities between the two concepts being
compared, such that metaphor creates an emergent feature, which
is a novel insight into the two previously unrelated concepts.
For Evans (1988), becoming aware of and exploring one’s
metaphors, including one’s novel metaphors, is part of becom-
ing more psychologically minded, and is especially important for
life metaphors, which, he claims, are often unconscious, involv-
ing tacit knowledge of one’s conscious and social experience.
Considering the metaphorical content of dream reports would
involve processes similar to Kopp and Craw’s (1998) 7-step inter-
view protocol for exploring and transforming client-generated
metaphors, which they propose aids the accessing and transform-
ing of tacit knowledge.
These accounts of metaphor provide a theoretical justifica-
tion for the proposal that examining dream content can result
in personal insight. Lakoff (1993) emphasizes that each person
has many conceptual metaphors that they do not have conscious
access to, nor control over. He argues that cognitive and linguis-
tic activity relies upon cognitive links which are created because
of aspects of similarity between idioms or concepts. This allows
the mapping of characteristics of one idiom or concept onto
another, creating “conceptual metaphors.” These metaphors are
claimed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to be very influential in
human understanding of the world, and as easily identifiable in
everyday language. One example they give of a common linguis-
tic metaphor within the English language is the “LOVE IS A
JOURNEY” metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1993).
This metaphor can be detected in descriptions such as “the rela-
tionship is running into trouble,” “the relationship is on the
rocks,” and “we must go our separate ways,” because romantic
attachment is being described in terms of physical movement.
Lakoff (1993) proposes that cognition during dreaming likewise
involves the mapping of abstract concepts onto physical concepts.
He suggests that metaphorical understanding of a dream is pos-
sible without personal information about the dreamer, but that
information about the dreamer allows metaphors specifically rel-
evant to the dreamer’s life to be interpreted, even though, in some
instances, the dreamer, uponwaking, does not knowwhether any-
thing from waking life is being expressed metaphorically by the
overt content.
However, whereas the link between dream content and
metaphor has been frequently proposed (e.g., Ullman, 1969;
Antrobus, 1977; Lakoff, 1993), and the ubiquity of the use of
metaphors in thinking has been described by Lakoff and Johnson
(1980), there is now debate about the extent of empirical evidence
for an embodied basis for conceptual metaphors (Shapiro, 2011).
For the purposes of the current paper, though, it is the ubiquity of
metaphorical thought that is important rather than the derivation
of basic concepts from direct physical experience, which Shapiro
criticizes. There has also been a criticism of Lakoff by Glucksberg
and McGlone (1999), who state that they “find no evidence
that people automatically and invariably draw upon fixed sets of
domain-to-domain mappings in order to interpret metaphors.”
They thus propose a “minimalist” account of metaphor produc-
tion and understanding, where the metaphor vehicle will often be
a prototypical member of an attributive category; the attributive
category is thus applied to the metaphor topic. They contrast this
with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) multiple mappings account, in
which there are systematic mappings between topic and vehicle,
derived from conceptual knowledge. Interestingly, for the current
paper, Glucksberg and McGlone’s (1999) simpler account of the
cognition required for metaphorical thinking might be taken as
more relevant to the levels of cognition that dreaming may be
capable of, and hence as according with Antrobus’ (1977) account
of metaphor in dreams.
DREAM APPRECIATION
To test the claim that insight can follow the consideration of
dream content, the current study uses the “Dream Appreciation”
technique devised by Ullman (1996). There has been work by
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DeCicco (2007a) on correlations between dream content mea-
sures and outcome measures that result from use of an earlier
version of the Ullman technique as described in Ullman and
Zimmerman (1979). DeCicco (2007a) concluded that partici-
pants found many connections between waking life and dream
content, with “discovery” experiences originating from the tech-
nique. However, mean outcome scores were not reported. To our
knowledge the current study is the first to report group mean
outcomes of the standard (Ullman, 1996) technique, apart from
a study summarized in a short report by Blagrove et al. (2010).
In that study there were 13 participants (4 males, 9 females;
all undergraduate students), 22 dreams were reported, and each
group session lasted from 45 to 75min. After the group a Visual
Analogue Scale (VAS), anchored 0 = not at all and 100 = very
much, was used for participants to rate the degree to which the
session gave them any new understanding of what the dream
means: here, mean rating on the VAS for this new understand-
ing about the dream variable = 67.8 (SD = 18.2). Another VAS,
also anchored 0 = not at all and 100 = very much, was used
for participants to respond to the question “Did the session for
this dream give you new understanding or insight about your-
self or about any aspect of your life?” Here, mean rating on the
VAS for this new understanding about yourself variable = 57.0
(SD = 15.5). Support was thus given for the usefulness of the
Ullman technique.
ULLMAN DREAM APPRECIATION PROCEDURE
One of the researchers (MB) has extensive experience of con-
ducting dream appreciation groups that follow the procedure
devised by Ullman (1996), and has received training from a lead-
ing associate and colleague of Montague Ullman. The procedure
involves the following stages: (1A) reading of the dream aloud
by the dreamer; (1B) clarification of the dream report by the
group asking questions of the dreamer; (2A) brief discussion of
the dream by the group members other than the dreamer so
as to imagine what feelings they would have experienced if the
dream were their own, and then, (2B), eliciting these individu-
als’ projections about the dream in terms of their own lives so as
to give symbolic or metaphorical meaning to the dream images;
(3A) response by the dreamer to stage (2); (3B.1) description
by the dreamer of his/her waking life context for the dream, in
terms of the dreamer’s life experiences, with particular empha-
sis on recent experiences and concerns; (3B.2) reading the dream
back to the dreamer, in the second person, so that any additional
information about the dream or waking life can be obtained;
and (3B.3) orchestration, in which all members of the group
suggest connections between information that the dreamer has
given about their dream and information the dreamer has given
about the dreamer’s life. For a full description of the process,
see Ullman (1996). The technique can be compared to Hill’s
(1996) Exploration-Insight-Action model of dream interpreta-
tion: Ullman’s stages 1A and 1B and 3B.1 are similar to the first
stage of Hill’s model, in which exploration of the dream occurs
through the dreamer telling the dream, reporting feelings from
the dream, and providing associations to the dream images, so as
to find waking life sources of the dream. Stage 2 and the dreamer’s
response to that stage would occur when the Hill model is used in
a group (Hill, 1996; Hill, Chapter 11). Ullman’s stage 3B.3 has
similarities with Hill’s Insight stage, in which possible meanings
of the dream are explored. The Ullman procedure thus mainly
maps onto the first two stages of the Hill technique, and does not
map onto the Hill model’s third, Action stage, in which behavioral
or cognitive changes as a result of the dream are considered. It
should be noted that such a restriction to the first two Hill stages
is also present in much clinical work with dreams. As stated by
Hill and Knox (2010, p. 9): “although both cognitively and psy-
choanalytically oriented therapists used many activities to work
with dreams, they most often focused on exploring and under-
standing the dreams; they rarely addressed how clients might
change their dreams ormake changes in waking life based on their
understanding of dreams.”
The Ullman technique thus relies on the identification by par-
ticipants of waking life sources of dream content, such as recent
events or concerns, with the non-directive assistance of the other
groupmembers. According to Hill et al. (1998), the use of associa-
tion allows clients to make “previously unconsidered connections
between dream images and other thoughts and memories,” and
they conclude that solely describing a dream, without produc-
ing associations, requires the client to stay within the dream, with
less likelihood of identifying “engagingly novel thoughts.” InHill’s
method the depth and accuracy of inferences from dream images
are dependent on the work carried out exploring the possibility of
associations between dream content and waking life experiences,
and increases in insight are found with more time spent in this
association stage (Hill et al., 1998).
However, in the eliciting of associations Grünbaum’s (1984)
tally argument does have to be borne in mind. This is the cri-
tique that even if a dreamer states that an item of dream content
is related to some aspect of waking life, there is no evidential value
to this belief of the client. Several aspects of the Ullman tech-
nique have the aim of reducing the forcefulness of suggestions
from groupmembers of relationships between dream content and
recent waking life experiences that the dreamer has described,
while keeping to the purpose of holding a group, which is that
group members may identify valid or plausible connections, not
hitherto recognized by the dreamer, between the dream report
and the dreamer’s recent life experiences. Obviously there may
be an experimenter demand in the search by participants for
memory sources of dreams, and in their consideration of how
plausible possible memories are as sources. However, although
this may operate for some decisions regarding sources, the empir-
ical literature does support the claim that dreamers can, when
awake, identify memory sources of dream content (Nielsen and
Stenstrom, 2005; Blagrove et al., 2011a,b), and categorize wak-
ing life associations into episodic and semantic memory sources
(Baylor and Cavallero, 2001; Fosse et al., 2003). Also, a more expe-
riential counter to Grünbaum’s argument can be found in Blass
(2002, pp. 169–188).
Kuiken et al. (2006) have differentiated between types of
dreams (e.g., transcendental, existential, mundane, nightmares)
and related this factor to level and type of insight following the
dream. In contrast, the current study involves the participant
recalling their most recent dream, whatever its content and per-
ceived impact or lack of impact. Furthermore, whereas Kuiken has
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also investigated type of dream and level of subsequent insight as
a function of previous experience (e.g., loss vs. trauma; Kuiken
et al., 2008), for the current study a participant’s waking life back-
ground is not known to the experimenters prior to any mention
of it in the group session.
The Dream Appreciation technique is used with the intention
of providing a way for an individual to connect the self as experi-
enced in the dream with the self as perceived and as experiencing
in waking life (Ullman, 1996). The potential for personal change
within this context is as an adaptation of conscious perspective.
In contrast, Hill’s (1996) Exploration-Insight-Action model uses
dreams in a therapeutic context, with an Action stage, in which an
individual can be encouraged or challenged to change behavioral
or cognitive processes after obtaining insight from working with a
dream. In the Action stage clients determine what they would like
to do differently, “in the dream, in life, or in continued work on
issues raised by the dream” (Hill et al., 1998). Change can there-
fore be actively pursued by a therapist using Hill’s (1996) method.
In contrast we chose the Ullman Dream Appreciation method as
it is appropriate for lay people to use in a non-therapeutic set-
ting, using the manual (Ullman, 1996) as a guide, and because it
has been used worldwide in various lay settings. Ullman (1996)
argues that there are also structural differences between formal
therapy and his Dream Appreciation technique. He asserts that
there is a hierarchical structure in therapy, in which the ther-
apist acts more as an authority figure compared to the leader
of a Dream Appreciation group. The emphasis in the Dream
Appreciation format is on the dreamer having overall control dur-
ing the process, the leader of the group is seen more as a safety
supervisor and a guide through the stages rather than a control-
ling influence. The individual who offers the dream regulates the
information that is shared with the group and holds the power to
decide whether anything discussed during the dream discussion
session is relevant or useful.
HYPOTHESES
In the current study, in order to assess outcomes from the Dream
Appreciation technique, participants rate their Exploration-
Insight gains, Experiential gains, and Action gains using the Gains
from Dream Interpretation questionnaire (Heaton et al., 1998),
and complete a Deepened Self-Perception questionnaire (Kuiken,
1995). We hypothesize the following:
(1) Participants would rate Exploration-Insight gains and
Experiential gains of the group procedure highly, and, specif-
ically, as highly as those found by participants who follow,
with a psychotherapist, the more widely researched Hill
(1996) method.
(2) As the Hill method has an aim of therapeutic change, whereas
this is not a specific aim of the Ullman method, the partici-
pants would rate Action gains of the Ullman procedure as
lower than the Exploration-Insight or Experiential gains, and
as lower than occurs for the Hill method.
(3) As Hill et al. (2001) found that the level of individuals’ Own
positive Attitude Toward Dreams (ATD) was significantly
related to the Exploration-Insight gains subscale score of
the Gains from Dream Interpretation (GDI) questionnaire,
there would be a significant positive correlation between the
OwnAttitude Toward Dreams subscale of Cernovsky’s (1984)
ATD questionnaire, completed prior to the group, and the
Exploration-Insight gains subscale of the GDI questionnaire,
completed after the group.
We also conduct an exploratory analysis of the amount of text of
the dream reports for which memory sources can be identified by
the dreamer, with the aim of comparing our results with those
of a previous study (Saredi et al., 1997) where a far less lengthy
consideration of each dream occurred.
COMPARISON CONDITIONS
The current dream appreciation study does not include a con-
trol condition, and so it is not possible to determine the role of
dream content in the group process, or to disentangle whether
any insights or gains during the group are dependent on the
dream content, or solely on the group process. The current study
aims to pilot how the effects of considering dream content in
an Ullman Dream Appreciation group can be measured, with
future studies then intended to include a control comparison. The
issue of a control can be illustrated by reference to Timpanaro
(1974/1985, pp. 29–45), who analyses an account by Freud of
how, by free-association, a slip of the tongue of a missing word
(Aliquis) in a Latin quotation can be linked to a current con-
cern of the person who was conversing with him and who made
the slip. Crucially Timpanaro shows how other words from the
quotation, for which there were not slips of the tongue, can also
be linked by free-association to the same concern, thus show-
ing for us the importance of control conditions to test that an
item of dream content can be linked to putative insight. Control
conditions were used in the study of dream interpretation by
Hill et al. (1993): participants who were involved in interpret-
ing their own dreams rated sessions as deeper and as producing
more insight than did participants who were involved in inter-
preting another person’s dreams or interpreting their own recent
troubling events. Hill et al. (1993) thus concluded that the effi-
cacy of dream interpretation does not seem to be solely due to
projection or to the process of interpreting any text, whether of
a dream or a text that is not of a dream. However, in Diemer
et al. (1996), therapist and client assessments of client insight did
not differ between a session of dream interpretation and a ses-
sion of interpretation of a recent troubling interpersonal event.
Each session lasted 50min and the dream or event was the focus
of the session for at least 40min. The only control condition in a
study using the Gains from Dream Interpretation questionnaire,
which is used in the current study, is the focussing on recent
loss condition in Hill et al. (2000), where Exploration-Insight for
that event condition was significantly lower than for the dream
condition.
For the loss condition in Hill et al. (2000), “therapists began
by asking clients to explore an aspect of their loss by describing it
in detail, associating to thoughts about loss, and exploring their
feelings related to the loss. During the insight stage, therapists
helped clients construct new understandings of their thoughts,
feelings and behaviors in relation to their loss.” However, a prob-
lem with such control conditions is that they cannot be used in a
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double-blind manner. This is a concern because Morewedge and
Norton (2009) have shown that individuals from both Eastern
and Western cultures believe that dreams contain hidden truths
and consider dreams to provide more meaningful information
about the world than do similar waking thoughts; this indicates
that a control condition, unless the justification or theory behind
it is very plausible to participants, would be at a disadvantage in
comparison to an own-dream condition. Hill et al. (1998) simi-
larly caution that experimenter demand can occur because of the
common view that dream interpretation involves making associ-
ations, a view that might not be commonly held for comparison
waking life event narratives.
Although a non-dream control condition is not included in the
current study, we do compare participants’ mean subscale scores
from the GDI questionnaire with subscale scores from partici-
pants in various studies on dream interpretation by Hill, and we
compare the current study subscale scores with those from the
control group in Hill et al. (2000) where participants focused on
a loss they had suffered rather than on a dream. In that study
a parallel form of the GDI, called the Gains from Therapy, was
developed for the loss condition, with the word dream replaced
by the word problem.
METHOD
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the
Swansea University Department of Psychology.
PARTICIPANTS
Eleven participants took part in the study [10 females, one male;
mean age = 19.2 years (SD = 0.75)]. They were all undergrad-
uate students studying psychology and they received experiment
participation credits for their voluntary participation. Individuals
responded to a recruitment advertisement and were invited to a
briefing session about the study, which was titled “Can ‘insight’
be obtained from dreams using the Ullman ‘Dream Appreciation’
group procedure?” At this session they completed a brief screen-
ing questionnaire, so as to assess whether they met inclusion
criteria of not suffering from or having had a history of any
psychological problems, and not having any personal issues that
might make it difficult for them to participate in a situation
involving a degree of self-disclosure.
MATERIALS
(a) The Attitude Toward Dreams questionnaire (ATD;
Cernovsky, 1984). This has three subscales, (1) own
attitude toward dreams, (2) perceptions of attitudes of
significant others toward dreams, and (3) perceptions of
attitudes of other people in general toward dreams or toward
individuals who publicly discuss dreams. There are 16 items,
scored as agree or disagree, the three subscales have 7, 5, and
4 items, respectively, and have scores ranging 0–7, 0–5, and
0–4, respectively.
(b) The Gains from Dream Interpretation questionnaire (GDI;
Heaton et al., 1998). This has 13 items and uses a 9 point
scale for each item (1–9, with descriptors “strongly dis-
agree” to “strongly agree”). This questionnaire comprises 3
subscales: Exploration-Insight gains, Experiential gains, and
Action gains. The Exploration-Insight gains subscale is of
particular importance to the current study, and is composed
of the following items:
(Due to a typographical error, item 2 of the GDI questionnaire,
“I learned more about what this dream meant for me personally
during the session,” and which would form part of this subscale,
is omitted). The Experiential gains subscale has 2 items: “During
the session I was able to re-experience the feelings I had in the
dream” and “I felt like I was actually reliving the dream during the
session.” The Action gains subscale has 5 items such as: “Because
of the session, I have more of a sense that I can change my dreams
when they are frightening or bad” and “I will use things that I
learned in this dream interpretation in my life.”
(c) Section A of Kuiken’s (1995) Deepened Self-Perception (DSP)
questionnaire. These items are:
1. I feel sensitive to aspects of my life I typically ignore.
2. My dream influenced my mood even after awakening.
3. My dream reminded me of events that occurred in my past.
4. My dream made me feel like changing the way I live.
A 10 point scale was used, from 0 to 9, with descriptors “strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree.”
PROCEDURE
At the briefing session participants were informed about what the
study involves and gave written informed consent to take part.
Individuals taking part in the study were encouraged to write their
dreams down each morning and to decide for themselves, when
a dream occurred, whether they wished to share and discuss it
in the group. When participants had a dream that they wished
to share, they contacted the researchers to arrange a convenient
time over the following few days for convening the dream group.
This follows the recommendation of Ullman that dreams that are
the subject of his technique should have occurred recently, unless
the group has already met many times, in which case the exam-
ination of older dreams is allowed. The dream group consisted
of two researchers (CE and MB) and the participant sharing the
dream; each participant came to a group only once. There were
thus 11 separate group sessions, each with one participant and
the two researchers. This group membership was used so as to
keep the group as consistent as possible, rather than having more
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1. I was able to explore my dream thoroughly during the ses-
sion.
6. I learned more from the session about how past events
influence my present behavior.
7. I learned more about issues in my waking life from working
with the dream.
8. I felt like I was very involved in working with the dream
during the session.
12. I learned things that I would not have thought of on my own.
13. I was able to make some connections between images in my
dream and issues in my waking life that I had not previously
considered.
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individuals involved. It was also necessitated by the need to have
the group meet as quickly as possible after the participant had a
dream, which can be difficult to timetable with several people.
For the group session, each participant had written their
dream report down upon waking and brought the report with
them. At the start of the session the participant completed the
Cernovsky (1984) ATD questionnaire, which assesses one’s per-
sonal attitude to dreams and one’s perceptions of the views of
others about dreams. After this the participant read out loud
their dream and the Ullman Dream Appreciation procedure, as
described above, was followed closely and in full for all 11 par-
ticipants. Note that the design of the study did not allow the
possibility of the dreamer briefly reporting any further consider-
ations or realizations about the dream at the next meeting of the
group, as only one meeting was scheduled for each participant.
After the Dream Appreciation Group the participants com-
pleted the 13 item GDI questionnaire (Heaton et al., 1998) and
section A of Kuiken’s (1995) DSP Questionnaire.
TRANSCRIBING AND SCORING DREAM REPORTS
The Dream Appreciation sessions were recorded with a digi-
tal voice recorder and then transcribed. The description of the
dream as stated at the start of the session (stage 1A of the
Ullman procedure) is termed here the initial dream. The initial
dream description in the transcription was amended accord-
ing to Antrobus’ (1983) definition of words to be retained in
dream reports, which are “all words in sentences or phrases in
which the subject was describing something that had occurred
just before waking. It excluded “ahs,” “uhms,” repeated and cor-
rected words, and all commentary on the experience, the report,
or the current status of the subject.” Next, the transcription
of the dream appreciation session was used to add additional
text to the initial dream, where details of the dream had been
remembered or clarified during the session. This process of uti-
lizing all information from the transcript of the session about
what to include in the dream text was conducted by the first
author (CE) and produces what we term the “canonical dream.”
The initial version of the dream and the canonical version of
the dream were then compared in terms of word lengths so
as to calculate a percentage change in word length due to the
session.
The canonical dream was then used so that the first (CE)
and second (JM) scorers could undertake the matching of dream
content to the dreamer’s waking life events and experiences as
recorded in the transcription of the session. The two scorers
worked independently in order to identify words in the dream
report that the dreamer asserted or agreed in the transcript are
linked with a source from their waking life or conscious experi-
ence. Each scorer highlighted words in the canonical version of
each dream that the dreamer linked with a source from their wak-
ing life. The highlighted versions of the canonical dream from the
two scorers were then compared with each other so as to calcu-
late inter-rater reliability. This was computed as the sum of the
number of words that both scorers agree do derive from specific
waking life experiences of the dreamer present in the transcript
and which the dreamer asserts is a source of the dream con-
tent, or words that both scorers agree do not derive from any
waking life experience described by the dreamer, divided by the
total number of words in the canonical dream, and expressed as a
percentage.
RESULTS
The dream group sessions lasted for as long as was needed to com-
plete all the stages of the Ullman technique; themean length of the
sessions was 67.18min (SD = 14.40). The 11 dreams initially pre-
sented by the participants in stage 1A had a mean length in words
of 543.27 (min = 216, max = 1654 words, SD = 431.02). The
canonical dreams had a mean length in words of 778.27 (min =
333, max= 1779, SD = 415.25). Themean percentage increase in
length of dream report as a result of the group process = 43.26%.
Table 1 shows group mean values for responses to the pre-
group ATD questionnaire, and the post-group GDI and DSP
questionnaires. The results from the subscale analysis of the
ATD questionnaire indicate that most participants in the study
were positive in their own attitude to dreams, and considered
that significant others and society in general are positive toward
dreams.
Table 1 | Group (n = 11) mean scores for Attitude Toward Dreams
(ATD) questionnaire subscales, the Gains from Dream Interpretation
(GDI) questionnaire subscales, three items on the GDI questionnaire
that relate to learning about one’s waking life, and the four Deepened
Self-Perception items.
Measure Scale range Mean SD
Own ATD 0–7 5.00 1.67
Significant others ATD 0–5 2.55 1.57
Society ATD 0–4 3.73 0.47
Exploration-Insight gainsa 1–9 8.17** 0.54
Experiential gains 1–9 7.28* 1.94
Action gains 1–9 5.78 1.04
Exploration-Insight gains item 6b 1–9 7.64 1.12
Exploration-Insight gains item 7c 1–9 7.36 1.12
Exploration-Insight gains item 13d 1–9 8.36 0.92
I feel sensitive to aspects of my life I
typically ignore
0–9 6.36 1.86
My dream influenced my mood even
after awakening
0–9 5.64 2.98
My dream reminded me of events
that occurred in my past
0–9 6.91 2.77
My dream made me feel like changing
the way I live
0–9 2.73 3.04
Comparison of Exploration-Insight gains and Experiential gains with Action gains:
**p < 0.001, *p < 0.05.
aDue to a typographical error, item 2 of the Gains from Dream Interpretation
questionnaire, “I learned more about what this dream meant for me personally
during the session,” is omitted.
bItem 6 “I learned more from the session about how past events influence my
present behavior.”
cItem 7 “I learned more about issues in my waking life from working with the
dream.”
d Item 13 “I was able to make some connections between images in my dream
and issues in my waking life that I had not previously considered.”
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Internal consistency for the GDI Exploration-Insight gains
subscale was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.61). Themean rat-
ing for Exploration-Insight gains showed that participants had
very high agreement that such gains had occurred. The three
items on the GDI questionnaire that are part of the Exploration-
Insight subscale and that refer specifically to learning about one’s
waking life are also reported in Table 1, and show high agree-
ment that such personal insight occurred (items 6, 7, and 13).
The mean of Experiential Gains was also high (and also with
high subscale internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha= 0.84). The
mean rating for Action Gains was lower, and with a low internal
consistency for the subscale (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.53). Matched-
sample t-tests showed that as hypothesized the Exploration-
Insight mean and Experiential mean were significantly higher
than the Action mean [t(10) = 9.79, p < 0.001 and t(10) = 2.37,
p < 0.05, respectively].
There were moderate ratings for two items on the DSP ques-
tionnaire: “I feel sensitive to aspects of my life I typically ignore,”
and “My dream reminded me of events that occurred in my past.”
A lower rating was given to “My dream influenced my mood even
after awakening,” and a far lower rating to “My dream made me
feel like changing the way I live.”
As hypothesized, the relationship between Own Attitude
Toward Dreams, assessed pre-group (where higher scores indicate
positive attitude), was significantly correlated with Exploration-
Insight gains as assessed by the GDI questionnaire (Spearman’s
rho = 0.68, p = 0.02). No other relationships between ATD and
GDI subscale scores were hypothesized, however, correlations
were conducted for exploratory purposes. All other correlations
between the ATD and GDI subscales were found to be non-
significant; rhos ranged from −0.30(p = 0.371) to 0.29 (p =
0.385). Although no relationships were hypothesized between the
ATD subscales and the DSP items, correlations were also con-
ducted for exploratory purposes. All of these correlations were
found to be non-significant; rhos ranged from−0.57(p = 0.067)
to 0.46 (p = 0.160). All correlations between the four DSP items
and the three GDI subscales were non-significant with the excep-
tion of DSP item 4 (My dreammademe feel like changing the way
I live) and Action gains, where rho = 0.71, p = 0.014. For the
other correlations, rhos ranged from −0.08(p = 0.826) to 0.48
(p = 0.137).
Words in each dream report for which dreamers identified
or acknowledged a waking life memory source during the ses-
sion were identified from the transcripts by two scorers working
independently. The inter-rater reliability, defined as percentage
of words in each canonical dream for which the scorers agreed
there either was, or was not, a waking life source stated in the
transcript, was 83.18% (SD = 4.68). The mean percentage of the
text of the canonical dream reports for which a waking life source
could be identified from the transcript was 18.3% (SD = 6.2) for
scorer 1 (CE), and 10.6% (SD = 4.8) for scorer 2 (JM). The mean
percentage for the 2 scorers combined was 14.4% (SD = 4.1).
The length of the initial and canonical dream reports in words,
and the percentage of dream report words for which a waking
life source was identified, were not significantly correlated with
any ATD or GDI subscale, nor any DSP item, when a correc-
tion for multiple correlations was applied (p < 0.005 criterion
used). For the correlations of the three dream report words mea-
sures with ATD subscales, rhos ranged from−0.36(p = 0.280) to
0.65 (p = 0.032); for the correlations with GDI subscales, rhos
ranged from −0.24(p = 0.478) to 0.74 (p = 0.009); for the cor-
relations with DSP items, rhos ranged from −0.32(p = 0.341) to
0.37 (p = 0.263). The only correlation out of the 30 tested that
approached the significance criterion was between the mean pro-
portion of dream report words for which a source was identified
and the GDI Experiential gains subscale (rho = 0.74, p = 0.009).
The correlations of GDI Exploration-Insight and Action gains
with percentage of dream report words for which a waking life
source was identified were negligible (rhos = 0.06 and −0.03,
respectively, ps = 0.861 and.926), and remained non-significant
when percentage of words data from the two scorers were ana-
lyzed separately. The correlations of DSP items with percentage of
dream report words for which a waking life source was identified
were also non-significant [rhos ranged from−0.06(p = 0.862) to
0.36 (p = 0.277)] and remained non-significant when percentage
of words data from the two scorers were analyzed separately.
There were some examples in the transcripts of what appeared
to be metaphorical references to waking life concerns. For exam-
ple, one participant described how one of her greatest fears is not
being able to have a baby. The participant shared a dream in which
she frequently protects her own mother, for example she “had to
like force her to run away” and provides her mother with advice
to escape danger, in one such instance she says “no, we’ve gotta
go” when the mother would have stayed in a precarious situa-
tion. The concept of parenthood maps onto acts of protection in
the dream, which is connected to her waking life desire to pre-
serve her own ability to become a mother in future, and therefore
“PARENTHOOD IS PROTECTION” can be suggested as a con-
ceptual metaphor in this dream, according to the Lakoff (1993)
model.
Table 2 shows means for the GDI subscales from the current
study and from all papers, to our knowledge, by Hill that report
group subscale means on the GDI. The mean rating in the cur-
rent study for Exploration-Insight gains of 8.17 is comparable to
many of the mean scores on this subscale reported by Hill and
is significantly higher than the only non-dream control condi-
tion in Hill that uses the GDI (Hill et al., 2000). Table 2 also
shows, for each GDI subscale, a meta-analysis mean of all dream-
interpretation conditions by Hill that assess that subscale; these
means are weighted by the number of participants in each study
or condition. The mean Exploration-Insight gain for the current
study is not significantly different from the weighted overall mean
on this subscale for the dream conditions in the Hill studies.
The mean Experiential gains for the current study is com-
parable to the means for this subscale in the papers by Hill. In
contrast, our Action gains mean was significantly below many of
the means for this subscale reported by Hill. The current study
subscale means for Experiential and Action gains do not differ
significantly from the Hill studies’ meta-analysis means for these
two subscales.
DISCUSSION
Participants gave a very high mean rating for their Exploration-
Insight gains from participating in the dream appreciation group.
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Table 2 | Gains from Dream Interpretation subscale means (and SDs) from papers by Hill, with comparison of current study with Hill studies’
subscale means, and comparison of current study means with weighted subscale means of all Hill dream conditions.
Authors Date Conditionaand sample size Exploration-insight gain Experiential gain Action gain
Current study Ullman dream group. (n = 11) 8.17 (0.54) 7.28 (1.94) 5.78 (1.04)
Heaton et al. 1998 Therapist-facilitated, following Hill (1996). (n = 25) 8.03 (0.73) 7.06 (1.50) 6.98 (1.07)**
Self-guided, following Hill (1996) as adapted by Hill
et al. (1996). (n = 25)
6.61 (1.35)** 6.76 (1.74) 5.99 (1.11)
Hill et al. 1998 Participants elaborate on image details in dream,
following only the Exploration Stage of the Hill
(1996) model. (n = 17)
4.61 (1.71)** Not reported Not reported
Participants provide associations to images,
following only the Exploration Stage of the Hill
(1996) model. (n = 17)
6.48 (1.35)** Not reported Not reported
Participants elaborate on image details and provide
associations. Following only the Exploration Stage
of the Hill (1996) model. (n = 17)
5.84 (1.76)** Not reported Not reported
Zack and Hill 1998 Used Hill (1996) model. (n = 38) 7.67 (1.10) 7.09 (1.42) 6.34 (1.74)
Rochlen et al. 1999 Pre-study discussion of benefits of dream
contemplation. Participants encouraged to use
strategies to boost dream recall prior to study
following Hill (1996). (n = 14)
7.48 (1.48) 7.00 (1.70) 6.03 (1.41)
Involved an introduction to Hill model and
participation in two sessions of the group
procedure prior to study following Hill (1996).
(n = 14)
8.04 (0.96) 6.79 (1.97) 7.01 (1.34)*
Pre-study discussion of theoretical perspectives
regarding counseling prior to study following Hill
(1996). (n = 14)
7.92 (0.82) 7.32 (1.48) 6.79 (1.22)*
Hill et al. 2000 Dream condition, following Hill (1996). (n = 7) 8.08 (0.52) 7.43 (0.97) 7.54 (0.49)**
Control condition: Recent loss focussed on, not a
dream (n = 7)b
6.63 (0.76)** 6.59 (0.99) 6.12 (0.82)
Wonnell and Hill 2000 Hill (1996) followed, action stage omitted (n = 23) 7.88 (1.06) Not reported 6.10 (1.24)
Hill (1996) followed, including Action stage (n = 20) 7.99 (1.00) Not reported 6.98 (1.45)*
Hill et al. 2001 Followed Hill (1996). (n = 105) 7.77 (1.20) Not reported Not reported
Hill et al. 2003 Participants type dream and computer-generated
voice asks questions, following Hill (1996). (n = 39)
6.72 (1.27)** Not reported 6.12 (1.73)
Therapist empathy: Followed Hill (1996) but
therapists did not offer interpretations or provide
action suggestions. (n = 26)
7.75 (0.85) Not reported 6.60 (1.16)
Therapist empathy + input: Followed Hill (1996), at
least one therapist interpretation and one action
idea offered to participants. (n = 29)
7.93 (0.93) Not reported 6.81 (1.05)**
All Hill studies Weighted mean (SD) of all Hill dream conditionsc 7.40 (1.15) 7.03 (1.56) 6.51 (1.34)
Significant difference between current study mean and Hill condition mean: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
aConditions reported used Hill (1996) one-to-one therapeutic procedure unless otherwise stated.
bA parallel form of the GDI, called the Gains From Therapy, was used for the loss condition, with the word dream replaced by the word problem.
cWeighted mean uses all Hill conditions in this Table except for the Hill et al. (2000) control condition. Means are calculated with weighting for number of participants
in each condition. There were no significant differences between current study subscale means and weighted subscale means of all Hill dream conditions.
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The mean rating in the current study for Exploration-Insight
gains is comparable to results from the studies by Hill, but is not
significantly higher than the weighted mean on this subscale of
all dream conditions in the Hill studies. Importantly, the current
study’s Exploration-Insight subscale mean significantly exceeds
the control (focusing on loss rather than a dream) condition
mean in Hill et al. (2000), as did also the dream condition in that
study. The mean Experiential gains in the current study is com-
parable to findings from studies of the Hill model. In contrast,
our Action gains mean is in some cases significantly less than that
found by Hill. For all three subscales the means from the current
study are not significantly different from the weighted subscale
means of the dream conditions in the Hill studies.
The low Action gain accords with the low rating given to the
item “My dreammade me feel like changing the way I live” on the
DSP questionnaire. On that questionnaire participants gave mod-
erate agreement ratings to two items: “I feel sensitive to aspects
of my life I typically ignore,” and “My dream reminded me of
events that occurred in my past.” There will be conflicting views
of whether the data from these two items give evidence for the
occurrence of insight. This is because the former item may reflect
redirected attention, rather than unprecedented insight, and the
latter item does not preclude the possibility that those events are
routinely remembered. Whether such state cognitive changes are
components of insight is a definitional as well as empirical matter
about which views will differ.
The results from the GDI accord with the conclusions of Pesant
and Zadra (2004) that exploring dream content and linking that
content to the dreamer’s waking life can help in the achievement
of insights and self-understanding. However, this was achieved
even though, according to the independent judges, participants
identified waking life sources for a mean of only 14.4% of dream
report text. This figure is comparable to that of Saredi et al.
(1997), where 17.3% of dream text was found to refer to waking
life concerns. Importantly, there was no significant or apprecia-
ble correlation between Exploration-Insight gains or Deepened
Self-Perception scores and percentage of dream text for which a
waking life source could be determined. This illustrates that a dis-
tinction needs to be made between insight about the sources of
an item of dream content (“aha, this is where that part of the
dream came from”) and insight about one’s waking life as a result
of considering the dream (“aha, this tells me about myself”). This
distinction is also made by DeCicco (2007b), with her separate
questions “Does the dream have meaning for you?” and “Do you
have any clear insight about your life from this dream?” We thank
an anonymous referee for the suggestion that furthermore it may
be that these two types of insight can be compared to the dis-
tinction between associative and metaphorical thinking, and we
note that it might even be that these two types of insight following
examination of dream content could have different time-courses.
For example, Pesant and Zadra (2004) suggest that reflecting on
dreams while awake can increase the awareness of one’s feelings,
but not immediately after awakening from the dream. However,
although these two types of insight can and should be distin-
guished, there may be instances where they occur together. This
is because the relationship between the metaphor in a dream (the
vehicle) and its waking life source (the tenor or topic) may extend
the meaning of both terms (Black, 1954-1955; Tourangeau and
Sternberg, 1982; Tourangeau and Rips, 1991). It is thus arguable
that any new metaphor will provide some restructuring of wak-
ing life knowledge, even if the waking life issues are known to the
dreamer and are already well-considered and explored.
Metaphorical references to waking life events and concerns
occurred during some of the dream appreciation sessions. We
suggest that the Ullman procedure results in the identification of
metaphors primarily during the orchestration stage (stage 3B.3),
but that even the earlier more associative stages may aid in this
process. Firstly, in stages 1A and 1B, the focus is on collecting
the dream report, and recalling as much of it as possible, with-
out the distraction of attempting to interpret or identify sources
of it. In stage 2B, parts of the dream content are matched by the
dream group members to their own schemata, using explicit pro-
jection. This helps to identify themes in the dream, which may
match themes in the lives of the other group members. This pro-
jective process does not use only simple associations to dream
images, but also the exploration of “metaphorical meaning that
links the image to a relevant bit of real-life experience” (Ullman,
1996, p. 35). In stage 3 the dreamer associates to and considers
events and feelings from the previous day and the days before that.
However, as stated byHill (1996, pp. 49–54) for her technique, but
of relevance here, when the dreamer (and, for us, group) iden-
tify a waking life schemata that is represented in the dream, the
situation may then involve metaphor rather than simple associa-
tion. This is so even if it was a single associated source that was
involved in exciting the schemata and leading to the formation
of the dream. The concept of association alone is thus not suf-
ficient to describe the exciting of schemata that is hypothesized
to be involved in dream production, nor sufficient to describe
the discovery of the excited schemata during association to the
dream. Hill’s conceptualization of dream formation and inter-
pretation as involving the integration of new experiences with
current schemata, and Ullman’s similar view of dreams making
connections between past and present “tensions,” can further-
more be linked to the sleep-dependent processes of abstraction
from experience, and integration of new experiences into cur-
rent schemata, as described by Lewis and Durrant (2011) and
Stickgold and Walker (2013). For both Ullman and Hill dream
imagery can thus be metaphorical rather than solely associative,
because recent emotional waking life events excite schemata (Hill,
1996) or unresolved tensions from the past (Ullman, 1996, p. 4),
which are themselves structured consequences of past experience.
Although only 14.4% of dream report text was identified as
being derived from specific waking life experiences, it may be
that such a small or minimal amount of text is sufficient to rep-
resent a metaphor or important connection to waking life. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for noting that this finding is simi-
lar to Hartmann’s work on the Central Image, or Contextualizing
Image in dreams, in which it is the quality or aptness of the text
that refers to waking life that is important, rather than necessar-
ily the quantity of text (Hartmann et al., 2001a,b; Hartmann and
Kunzendorf, 2005-2006).
Regarding the generalizability of our group findings to indi-
viduals examining their own dreams, either on their own, or very
briefly with others, a caveat is needed that the dream appreciation
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sessions required approximately one hour of detailed consider-
ation of each dream. This may explain the difference between
our results and those of Schredl and Erlacher (2007). In their
study 444 students and 636 online respondents answered a ques-
tionnaire about dream recall frequency and creative dreams. The
former sample was of mainly psychology students recruited to a
study entitled “sleep, dreams, and personality.” The latter sam-
ple was of individuals recruited to an on-line study on lucid
dreaming. Despite what may have been a recruitment that favored
individuals interested in dreaming, respondents reported that just
7.8% of their recalled dreams were creative. The themes of the 272
creative dreams that were reported were classed into 4 categories:
artistic creativity, (non-interpersonal) problem-solving, impulses
and emotional insights. Forty of the 272 creative dreams were
classed as giving emotional insight. This indicates that approx-
imately 1.2% of dreams, which are presumably not the sub-
ject of a formal group examination, produce emotional insight,
for individuals who may have a positive attitude to dreaming.
Contrasting this figure with the results of the present study, it
may thus be that it is only with some time spent on examina-
tion of dreams [for example, approximately an hour in the current
study, or 40–50min in Diemer et al. (1996), or 13min in Hill et al.
(2013)], and possibly with the help of others that a higher level
of emotional insight can be obtained from examining dreams.
However, in favor of generalizability of the current results, all par-
ticipants in the current study took part in order to receive course
credits and thus were not required to have an especial interest in
dreams, or a particular belief about dreams. The preponderance
of females in our sample, though, does mean that there may have
been a more positive attitude toward dreams (Schredl, 2010), and
greater interest in dream interpretation (Schredl and Piel, 2008),
than for a sample with more males, and this may have influenced
the GDI and DSP results.
A criticism of the current dream appreciation study is that
a comparison non-dream control condition was not part of the
study, and control conditions should indeed be used in future
studies. In addition to having conditions based on the appreci-
ation or interpretation of texts other than dream reports, such as
reports of waking life episodes, or the dream of another person,
conditions based on components of the Ullman technique could
also be used, to which the full Ullman procedure would be com-
pared. Such a method of comparing to isolated components of
the technique has been used by Hill in controlled studies of her
model. A further criticism is that it may be that alternative meth-
ods or schools of interpreting dreams (many of which are detailed
in Cushway and Sewell, 2013) might result in different gains
scores from those here, whether higher or lower. And it may even
be that some individuals are better attuned to identifying or utiliz-
ing free-associations. Evidence for this ability is shown by Cohen
et al. (2011), who found that psychoanalysts were better able
to recognize healthy adults who had experienced sibling cancer
during childhood, from 5-min of spontaneous free-associating
speech, than were medical students, oncologists, cognitive behav-
ioral therapists and individuals with a history of a sibling with a
cancer.
We wish to consider finally two explanations for what appears
to be dream content being a source of insight. As reviewed
above, there may be functional characteristics of sleep, and espe-
cially REM sleep that underlie emotional memory processing and
which result in novel connections beingmade betweenmemories,
with this memory enhancement, and creative abstraction from
experience, then being reflected in dream content. An alternative
view that beneficial consequences of examining dream content are
unrelated to any functional role of sleep, is proposed by Blagrove
(2011). In this epiphenomenal view of dreaming, beneficial con-
sequences of examining dream content are not related to any
functional characteristic of sleep, and may instead be related to
a decreased self-censorship in cognition during sleep, a view pro-
posed by Freud (1953/1900). Although both these explanations
allow for recalled dreams to be a source of insight, they differ in
their ascription of whether there is any cognitive consequence to
unremembered dreams. In addition, as stated in the introduction,
and detailed in Blagrove (2011), the null hypothesis that dream-
ing is not a source of personal insight, should still be borne in
mind. There are similarly different explanations for the finding
that, as hypothesized, the Exploration-Insight gains in the current
study correlated significantly with pre-group assessment of Own
positive Attitude Toward Dreams. One explanation for the corre-
lation is that individuals who are more positive in general toward
dreams are better able to identify associations and metaphorical
references to waking life in their dreams; they take the dream seri-
ously as a possible source of new information, and thus engage
in the discovery and exploration of the dream. A second expla-
nation, however, is that individuals who are highly positive on
ATD are flexible and attuned to many sources of information,
including suggestions made by group members, and are will-
ing and able to engage in relaxed, gently inquisitive discussions
about their emotional and personal life. They are able to identify
useful associations to various materials, whether dreams, Tarot
cards or personal events, or to confabulate those associations, and
acknowledge their own gains from such a group activity.
Obviously the stage of sleep that the 11 dreams reported here
came from is unknown, although it would be expected that most
would be from REM sleep. Whereas theoretical reasons for sug-
gesting that REM dreams may afford more insight than NREM
dreams were reviewed in the introduction, a more cognitive
rather than physiological view of dreaming (such as by Foulkes,
1985 or Domhoff, 2003) would not give such weight to this
distinction between stages of sleep. Furthermore, other authors
argue in favor of a greater effect of SWS sleep than REM sleep
on the process of cognitive insight and memory-consolidation
(e.g., Yordanova et al., 2008, 2010, 2012; Born and Wilhelm,
2012). Future studies will need to address whether REM sleep,
N3 (SWS), or N2 dreams result in the same or different levels of
insight when dream reports from those sleep stages are consid-
ered in a dream group procedure. The consideration of REM sleep
dreams was found by Cartwright et al. (1980) to reduce drop-out
rates for psychotherapy in comparison to a group not subjected
to awakenings and collection of dream reports in the sleep lab.
However, there was no significant difference in drop-out rates
between this REM dream group and a group awakened the same
number of times fromNREM sleep. Instead, recall and discussion
of dreams, whether elicited from REM or NREM sleep, was asso-
ciated with staying in psychotherapy treatment, in comparison
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to the group that did not sleep in the lab, and was also associ-
ated with a greater expression of affect during the psychotherapy.
It may thus be that levels of insight during a dream apprecia-
tion session will not differ between REM and NREM dreams,
especially if dream report length is controlled. Yet, as Cartwright
et al. (1980) did not measure insight as a result of consider-
ing dreams, it remains possible that REM and NREM dreams
differ in their ability to be a source of insight, even if they do
no differ on the outcome measures used by Cartwright et al.
(1980).
To summarize, participants reported a high level of
Exploration–Insight gains following the dream appreciation
group procedure. However, due to the lack of a control condition
run as part of a single experiment with the dream appreciation
condition, the data reported here are insufficient for determining
whether dream content itself is a source of insight. There are
theoretical reasons for thinking that the dream group process
is more than a supportive social discussion, or placebo, due to
its reliance on a dream which has been formed under brain
conditions that encourage, according to some theories, an
integration of new with old memories and abstraction of waking
life experiences into schemata. We hope that future studies may
now follow the method here, and also include the assessment of
gains from non-dream report control conditions.
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